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Abstract
Using a DGE model where the government is fully characterized, we com-
pute the steady state relationship between the public debt/output ratio and
the size of the government, measured as the total public expenditures/output
ratio. We nd the existence of a negative relationship between public debt
long-run sustainable limit and government size. Calibration of the model for
the Greek economy reveals that, for the period just before the current re-
cession, i.e. 2002-2006, the steady state debt to GDP ratio (the long-run
sustainability level) was 236.5%, whereas the observed gure for the same pe-
riod was around 100%. Nevertheless, the crisis starting in 2007 provokes fast
growth in the total public expenditures to output ratio, driving the Greek
economy to the long-run unsustainable-debt region. We conclude that an
original scal indiscipline did not cause the debt crisis and we have to look for
alternative causes such as a credit crunch and/or gambling for redemption.
We nd that a gambling for redemption attitude towards the recent crisis
triggered the Greek public nancial disaster by crossing the debt frontier.
JEL Classication: H5; H6.
Keywords: Fiscal policy, government expenditure, public debt sustain-
ability, gambling for redemption, Dynamic General Equilibrium models.
1 Introduction
One of the many derivations caused by the ongoing international nancial crisis has
focused the attention of economists and policy makers on the sovereign debt crisis,
which is hitting some countries of the Euro Area with particular intensity. The
severity of the debt crisis starting in 2008 and its disastrous potential consequences
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have fueled a debate where di¤erent measures have been proposed to prevent a sim-
ilar crisis in the future and to provide stability to the European currency union.
Those proposals can be summarized in two categories: economic reforms to provide
long-term stability and zero budget decits, and automatic economic and politi-
cal sanctions for decit sinners, to provide short-term stability. These proposals
made by European leaders have been endorsed by the European Commission led by
Barroso and the European Council led by Van Rompuy, and seem to be the most
fundamental part of a comprehensive solution package to solve the European crisis.
Other proposals such as the creation of a Eurobond or the increased involvement
of the European Central Bank acting as a lender of last resort have also been dis-
cussed. However, such economic policies have important caveats: they would imply
huge transfers of income from the North to the South, are legally dubious accord-
ing to the Treaty and the statutes of the ECB and consequentially, these proposals
have encountered enormous resistance from several Member States regarding their
implementation.
A reverse-engineering of the proposed solutions for the European debt crisis
shows that the origins of this crisis can be found in i) A crisis of imbalances, caused
by the weak competitiveness of peripheral Europe, and ii) A scal crisis, due to
either direct scal indiscipline in the cases of Portugal and Greece, and irresponsible
nancial policies that triggered excessive scal guarantees, as in the cases of Ireland
and Spain.
The question we want to study in this paper is whether the current European
scal crisis is a consequence of past scal indiscipline (as implied by the austerity
policies), or a bad response from political leaders pursuing generalized scal stim-
ulus as providing excessive scal guarantees. In particular, we want to explore the
Gambling for Redemption theory of Conesa and Kehoe (2011), where a xed and
exogenous probability of scal revenues recovery invites for a gambling not even pre-
cluded by the possibility of a bailout. While at times this gambling works, sometimes
the bet is lost triggering all aspects of an economic disaster.
We test the Gambling for Redemption theory using a diagram where two key
ratios of scal data of a given country are plotted together with a line obtained
from the collection of steady states from a general equilibrium model. To provide
a clearer idea of the diagram we use, consider the budget equation of a government
that cannot resort to money printing:
Tt + (Bt+1  Bt) = Gt + rBt
Fiscal revenues plus newly issued debt must nance current spending plus the service
of existing debt at a given exogenous rate. The steady state equation is:
Tss  Gss = rBss
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stating that an economy has to generate enough primary scal surpluses to nance
the service of its debts to be sustainable long-term. If we divide the above equation
by the steady state GDP, Yss; we obtain:
Bss
Yss
=

r
  1
r
Gss
Yss
where  is just the average steady state tax rate Tss=Yss: This equation, provides
a mechanical relation between the two key ratios that we use to test the Gambling
for Redemption hypothesis. However, the above equation is too simple. It does
not take into consideration the various forms of taxation and expenditures that a
government can use. The non-linearities that arise from government interventions
in the economy are an important part of our test, and therefore our goal is to model
a rich public sector that captures those non-linearities.
To this end we construct a DGE model where the role of the government a¤ects
a large variety of scal policies on both sides of the government budget restriction:
revenues and expenditures.
In our model, total government spending is divided into several variables: public
consumption of goods and services; public investment in physical capital; a public
wage bill; transfer payments to households; and interest payments of public debt.
As we will show in this paper, the amount of total debt is not independent from
the spending policies, as di¤erent shares of total government spending have di¤erent
e¤ects on scal income: for example, spending in social transfers does not improve
productivity of private factors, whereas increasing public investment does. There-
fore, the amount of sustainable debt varies across policies. On the other hand, public
revenues are raised by taxation and new debt issuance. We consider the existence
of ve taxes: consumption tax, labor income tax, capital income tax, social security
tax and a corporate tax. Additionally, we include the scal funding of the social
security system of the economy as a pay-as-you-go system.
As debt is modelled as if bond markets were innitely liquid, the term structure
of the debt is irrelevant in our model. Any maturing bond can always be rolled over
at the given rate in the steady state. This paper attempts to quantify the maximum
amount of debt that a government can sustain by assuming that lenders always lend.
We do not allow for self-fullling crises. These crises arise when lenders think that
a government will not repay its debt. If lenders think a government will not repay,
they do not lend. If a government cannot roll over the portion of its debt becoming
due within a period, it may choose to default even though it would not default if the
lenders do lend. This is the idea in Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000). The maximum
level of debt that can be sustained if lenders do not lend is much lower than the
maximum that can be sustained if they do lend. Conesa and Kehoe (2011) show
that governments with low debt can choose to run this debt up to levels where they
risk crises if their country is unlucky enough to be in a recession period after period.
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This is the idea of Gambling for Redemption.
With this assumption of a perfect rolling over of debt, we compute the maximum
level of sustainable debt, and provide a picture of the frontier dividing the sustainable
region from the unsustainable region for any given level of public expenditure to
GDP ratio. We nd the existence of a steady state negative relationship between
public debt/GDP ratio long-run sustainable limit and government size (measured
as the total public expenditures/output ratio).
We have chosen Greece for our study because it was the rst country under the
currency union to lose its triple A rating on government bonds, and the country
has faced strong pressure to consolidate the budget. We carefully calibrate the
model to reach the conclusion that Greece was well inside the sustainable debt
to GDP ratio when the crisis hit. Then, the government decided not to respond
with an immediate reduction in government spending. On the contrary, government
spending smoothly kept increasing. The government consumption to GDP ratio
increased as a consequence, rapidly driving the economy to the unsustainable region.
In the meantime, the recovery didnt happen. We conclude that a Gambling for
Redemption attitude rather than scal indiscipline is behind the Greek debt crisis
drama.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model,
Section 3 discusses the calibration exercise, the main results from the calibrated
model to the Greek economy are shown in Section 4, and nally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We develop a general equilibrium model where the government a¤ects private de-
cisions in a number of ways. We consider the role of taxes, public consumption of
goods and services, public investment in public capital, public labor markets and
public debt.
We rst describe the behavior of the government, then the rms, and nally
the households. The government displays a high degree of disaggregation in both
expenditures and scal income sides. On the expenditure side, we distinguish four
components: public consumption of goods and services; public investment in capital;
public wage bill; and transfers. On the scal income side, we consider four income
taxes (consumption tax, labor income tax, capital income tax and corporate tax)
plus revenues from the social security tax.
Firms are represented by a CES production function nested within a standard
Cobb-Douglas. The production of the nal output requires four factors: labor ser-
vices and capital, both private and public. Finally, consumers are modeled in a
standard way, but including public goods in the utility function and splitting worked
hours between the private and the public labor sectors.
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2.1 The Government
First, we describe the instruments at the governments disposal with the elements
present in the government budget constraint:
Gt +R
B
t Bt +Dt = Tt +R
D
t Dt + CBTt +Bt (1)
Equation (1) says that all cash outlays (including transfer payments to house-
holds) - for non-interest total government spending (Gt), interest payments of total
government debt (RBt times Bt), and new purchases of nancial assets (Dt) - must
be funded by some combination of tax receipts (Tt), interest earnings on govern-
ment assets (RDt times Dt), transfers from the central bank (CBTt), and new debt
issuance (Bt).
For Eurozone countries, transfers from the central bank are zero, and direct
purchases of government bonds are precluded by the Treaty (i.e. CBTt = 0): If we
denote by Bt the net position of the government, we can also set nancial purchases
to zero (i.e. Dt = 0):
2.1.1 Government spending
Non-interest total government spending is dened as:
Gt = Cg;t + (1 + 
ss
t )Wg;tLg;t + Ig;t + Zt (2)
where Cg;t is public consumption of goods and services, Ig;t is public investment,
Wg;tLg;t is the wage bill for public employees and Zt are transfer payments to house-
holds, such as welfare, social security or unemployment benet payments.
We assume that a certain level of public capital is necessary in the aggregate
production function. Public investments accrue into the public structures stock.
We assume the following accumulation process for the public capital:
Kg;t = (1  Kg)Kg;t 1 + Ig;t (3)
which is analogous to the private capital accumulation process.
2.1.2 Government decision rules
We need to specify the government decision rules. These decision rules imply the
election of i) a certain level of public spending and ii) its distribution among the
di¤erent components.
The level of government spending in the long run, given a certain amount of scal
revenues, depends on the target level for the public decit and public debt. While
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the Maastricht Treaty1 establishes limits together with sanctions for decit and debt
sinners, these limits have only been respected to enter into the monetary union, but
never after that date. Therefore, we do not consider the Maastricht criteria to be
binding for these two variables.
The distribution among the di¤erent components of public spending is as follows.
Cg;t = 1Gt
Ig;t = 2Gt
(1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t = 3Gt
Zt = 4Gt
where 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 1. McGrattan et al. (1997) assume that public spending
on goods and services is a stochastic process around a constant proportion of total
output. We follow the same framework for the components of total government
spending but in a deterministic environment.
2.1.3 Public labor market
The public labor market is modeled following the work of Fernández de Córdoba,
Pérez and Torres (2012). The purpose of the mechanism described in this section is
to distort the labor market to prevent wages equalization between the private and
the public sector. An analysis of the public labor market among OECD countries
show that the public wage bill is a source of major di¤erences among these countries.
Our analysis shows that government interventions in the wage setting of public wages
can have a signicant e¤ect not only on the wage bill, but also in the growth path
of the economy a¤ecting the income shares of private inputs, having therefore a
long-term e¤ect on the debt frontier.
We have chosen a mechanism where the government has preferences over the
number of public workers and their pay. To provide an objective function for the
government, we follow a standard text-book approach (for example see Oswald et al.,
1The Treaty on European Union was signed on 7 February 1992 by the members of the European
Community in Maastricht, Netherlands. The Treaty led to the creation of the euro, and stablished
a set of rules imposing control over ination, public debt and the public decit, exchange rate
stability and the convergence of interest rates. With regard to public nances it imposed an
annual limit of 3% in the ratio of government decit to GDP, and a 60% of gross government debt
prior to the entry in the European Monetary System
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19842) and pose an objective function for the government as the solution of a game
between a public sector union that cares about the wages of public-sector employees,
Wg;t and a government that cares about the level of public employment, Lg;t given its
budget constraint. Thus, the government wants to maximize the following objective
function subject to a budget constraint:
max

!W g;t + (1  !)Lg;t
1=
(4)
where ! is the weight given to wages and  is a negative parameter indicating the
curvature of the trade-o¤ between the elements present in the objective function of
the government. If ! is close to zero, then the main goal of the government is to
maximize public employment (benevolent government preference), whereas if ! is
close to one, the main goal of the government is to maximize public wages (public
sector unions preferred option).
Note that expression (4) encompasses the di¤erent approaches found in the lit-
erature. On the one hand, it takes into account the fact that public employment
and wages are determined in an environment di¤erent to the private sector. The
government itself can increase the number of public employees or can increase public
wages subject to the budgetary constraint. On the other hand, it takes into account
the fact that trade unions are more important in the public labor sector than in the
private sector (see for instance Blanchower, 1996).
As dened previously, the government wage bill is dened as:
3Gt = (1 + 
ss
t )Wg;tLg;t (5)
Maximizing the government objective function subject to the government budget
constraint is to nd critical values for the auxiliary Lagrangian function:
$g () = max

!W g;t + (1  !)Lg;t
1=
+  (3Gt   (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t)
That provides, upon di¤erentiation, the rst order necessary conditions:
@$g ()
@Wg;t
=

!W g;t + (1  !)Lg;t
1= 1
!W  1g;t   (1 +  sst )Lg;t = 0
@$g ()
@Lg;t
=

!W g;t + (1  !)Lg;t
1= 1
(1  !)L 1g;t   (1 +  sst )Wg;t = 0
Dividing orderly:
!W g;t = (1  !)Lg;t (6)
2On related grounds Ardagna (2007) and Forni and Giordano (2003) consider the wage bill of
the government, employment and wages, separately as arguments of the objective function of the
government or the public sector union.
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Combining this expression with equation (5) we obtain that public wages and
employment are equal to:
Wg;t =

!
1  !
 1=2 
3Gt
(1 +  sst )
1=2
(7)
Lg;t =

!
1  !
1=2 
3Gt
(1 +  sst )
1=2
; if Wg;t > Wp;t (8)
This distribution of the public resources depends on government preferences.
However, private and public sectors are competing for the same labour input and
as a consequence there is a relationship between public sector and private sector
wages inducing a wage premium. The wage premium is implicit in equation (8) and
it is part of the solution of the governments problem. This wage premium ensures
the government that its demand for labor will be satised. This relationship will
become clearer once we present the households problem.
2.1.4 Tax revenues
The government obtains resources from the economy by taxing consumption and
income from labor, capital and prots, whose e¤ective average tax rates are denoted
by  ct ; 
l
t; 
k
t ; 

t , respectively. Additionally, we consider a pay-as-you-go social secu-
rity system and thus we include the social security tax,  sst . The government budget
in each period is given by,
Tt = 
c
tCp;t + 
l
t(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 
k
t (Rt   Kp)Kp;t 1
+ ktR
B
t Bt + 
ss
t (Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 

tt
where Cp;t is private consumption, Wp;t is private sector wages, Lp;t is private labor,
Rt is the rental rate of private capital, Kp is the depreciation rate of private capital,
Kp;t is private capital stock, and t are prots to be dened later.
2.1.5 The government identity
As we previously argued the government budget constraint can be written as:
Gt + (1 +R
B
t )Bt = Tt +Bt+1
With the meaning that non nancial spending, plus servicing the existing govern-
ment debt must be nanced through taxes plus new debt.
Putting together all the elements dened above, the government budget con-
straint can be written as:
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Cg;t + (1 + 
ss
t )Wg;tLg;t + Ig;t + Zt + (1 +R
B
t )Bt
=  ctCp;t + 
l
t(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t)
+ kt (Rt   Kp)Kp;t 1 +  sst (Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + tt +Bt+1 (9)
or, collecting uses and resources:
Cg;t +Wg;tLg;t + Ig;t + Zt + (1 +R
B
t )Bt
=  ctCp;t + 
l
t(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 
k
t (Rt   Kp)Kp;t 1
+ sst Wp;tLp;t + 

tt +Bt+1 (10)
2.2 Firms
The problem of the rm is to nd optimal values for the utilization of labor and
capital given the presence of public inputs. The representative rm operates a CES
production function nested within a standard Cobb-Douglas production function,
and thus this technology exhibits a constant return to private factors. The produc-
tion of nal output, Y , requires labor services, L and capital, K, both private and
public. Goods and factors markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The
rm rents capital and hires labor to maximize period prots, taking factor prices
and public labor and capital as given. The technology is given by:
Yt = AtK
p
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)
 (11)
where Yt is aggregate output, At is a measure of total-factor productivity, p and g
are private and public capital share of output respectively,  measures the weight of
public employment relative to private employment and  = 1=(1  ) is a measure
of the elasticity of substitution between public and private labor inputs.
If we assume nal output to be the unit of account, prots are dened as:
t = AtK
p
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t+(1 )Lg;t]
(1 p g)
   (1+  sst )Wp;tLp;t RtKp;t 1 (12)
Under the assumptions that private workers are paid their marginal productivity,
we get:
(1 +  sst )Wp;t = (1  p   g)AtKpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 L 1p;t
Rt = pAtK
p 1
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

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From the above equations, it is found that private factor incomes are:
(1 +  sst )Wp;tLp;t = (1  p   g)AtKpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 Lp;t
=
(1  p   g)Lp;t
Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t
Yt
RtKp;t 1 = pYt (13)
The aggregate production function has four productive factors. However, the
two public factors have no market price. The government does not usually charge a
price that covers the full cost of the services provided with the contribution of public
factors. This implies that those rents generated by public factors are not assigned
to public factors. As public factors are paid by the government, there is a positive
prot, t, which turns out to be3:
t = Yt  RtKp;t 1   (1 +  sst )Wp;tLp;t > 0
We assume that prots are paid out to households given that they are the owners
of the rm.
2.3 Households
In our model economy, the decisions made by consumers are represented by a stand-
in consumer with a period utility where consumption can be decomposed into two
components:
U(Ct; Lt) = U(Cp;t; Cg;t; Lt) (14)
where Cp;t is private consumption and Cg;t is consumption of the same private good
provided by the government to the consumer. We assume that households obtain
utility from the public spending in good and services. In particular, we assume that:
Ct = Cp;t + Cg;t with  2 (0; 1] (15)
Householdspreferences are given by the following instantaneous utility function:
U(Ct; NtH   Lt) =  logCt + (1  ) log(NtH   Lt) (16)
Leisure is NtH   Lt; where H is total time endowment and it is calculated as
the number of e¤ective hours in the week times the number of weeks in a year times
population in the age of taking labour-leisure decisions, Nt; minus the aggregated
3See appendix A.2
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number of hours worked in a year, Lt: The parameter  (0 <  < 1) is the fraction
of private consumption on total private income. Households consume nal goods
and supply labour to the private and the public sectors,
Lt = Lp;t + Lg;t (17)
where Lt is the aggregate level of employment, Lp;t is private employment and Lg;t is
public employment. Public employment is chosen by the government and thus it is
exogenously given to the households. At an aggregate level, the household can only
choose the supply of private labour, Lp;t = Lt Lg;t. Recall that public employment
demand is fully covered by the household, provided that Wg;t > Wp;t:
The budget constraint faced by the stand-in consumer is:
(1 +  ct)Cp;t +Kp;t  Kp;t 1 +Bt+1  Bt (18)
= (1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] + (1   kt )(Rt   )Kp;t 1 (19)
+(1   kt )RBt Bt + Zt + (1  t )t (20)
where Kp;t is private capital stock, Wp;t is private compensation per employee, Wg;t
is public compensation per employee, Rt is the rental rate of capital, Kp is the
capital depreciation rate which is modelled as tax deductible and t denotes prots
from rms, as dened previously. The budget constraint states that consumption
and investment, in physical capital and government bonds, cannot exceed the sum
of labour and capital rental incomes and prots net of taxes .
Capital holdings evolve according to:
Kp;t = (1  Kp)Kp;t 1 + Ip;t (21)
where Ip;t is households gross investment.
The problem faced by the stand-in consumer is to maximize the value of her
lifetime utility given by:
MaxfCt;Ltg1t
1X
t=0
t

 log(Cp;t + Cg;t) + (1  ) log(NtH   Lp;t   Lg;t)

(22)
subject to the budget constraint, where (Kp0; Kg0; B0) and the paths of public em-
ployment and taxes are given, and where  2 (0; 1), is the consumers discount
factor. The Lagrangian auxiliary function is:
$() =
1X
t=0
t[ log(Cp;t + Cg;t) + (1  ) log(NtH   Lp;t   Lg;t) + :::
tf(1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] + (1   kt )(Rt   )Kp;t 1
+(1   kt )RBt Bt + Zt + (1  t )t   :::
((1 +  ct)Cp;t +Kp;t  Kp;t 1 +Bt+1  Bt)g]
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The rst order conditions for the consumer maximization problem are:
@$
@Cp;t
= 
1
Cp;t + Cg;t
  t(1 +  ct) = 0 (23)
@$
@Lp;t
=  (1  ) 1
NtH   Lp;t   Lg;t
+ t(1   lt)Wp;t = 0 (24)
@$
@Kp;t
= t+1

t+1
 
1 + (1   kt+1)(Rt+1   Kp)
  tt = 0 (25)
@$
@Bt
= t 1t 1   tt(1 + (1   kt )RBt ) = 0 (26)
Plus the budget constraint and two transversality conditions stating that the today-
value of long distant future values of assets are zero.
This formulation implies that the wage-setting process in the private sector is
totally di¤erent to that of the public sector. Whereas in the private sector wages are
determined in terms of their marginal products, in the public sector a given amount
from the governments budget constraint is distributed between public wages and
public employment.
Note that the above expressions imply that the consumer can only choose the
supply of private labour, given that public labour is determined inelastically by the
government at a wage that includes a positive premium that guarantees that all
public labor demand is covered by the consumer at any market Wp;t.
Walrass Law is satised at all times4. From equations (25) and (26) we obtain
a non arbitrage steady state condition
R = Kp +R
B
The real return to capital has to equate the depreciation rate due to the use
of physical capital plus the real return of the competing bond, including any risk
premium.
3 Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model for the Greek economy. We select this economy
as our case study given that it represents a benchmark for studying the causes of a
debt crisis, as it was the rst country under the currency union to lose its triple A
rating on government bonds. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the public debt/GDP
ratio (left scale) and total public expenditure/GDP ratio (right scale) for the period
2002-2011. Both ratios remain almost constant for the period 2002-2006. As these
gures are central in our analysis, we choose the average values of the macroeconomic
4See Appendix A for a proof.
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variables for the Greek economy for this period as the steady state for our model
economy.
[Insert here Figure 1]
The steady state of the model economy is computed as follows: Some parameter
values are computed from ratios taken from the national accounts, other parameters
are taken from the set of equilibrium conditions while the technological parameters
of the nested CES (production function are estimated using standard econometric
techniques. The parameter  = Gt=Yt; takes values from the interval [0; b]: For any
given vector that denes the scal policy ( k;  l;  c;  ss; ; 1; 2; 3; 4); we compute
the steady state values for prices and quantities that satisfy the set of rst order
conditions and the market clearing equations described above, for each value  =
Gt=Yt.
First, the parameters of the model are calibrated to replicate some salient fea-
tures of the Greek economy. Total output at the calibration point (years 2002-2006),
is set to YSS = 100: From OECD statistics we obtain the ratio of total govern-
ment expenditures (GSS=YSS = 0:4504), total (both public and private) investment
(ISS=YSS = 0:2236); and total consumption (CSS=YSS = 0:7764), as well as the frac-
tion of total labour force actually employed (LSS=HSS = 0:5750). Notice that public
and private consumption plus total investment is total GDP. The reason for this is
that our measure ofGt adds to public consumption all transfers to the consumer such
as public education, public health, transfers for the unemployed and the public wage
bill. The public wage bill of Greece represents about 31% of total government ex-
penditure. In particular, this parameter is set to 3 = 0:3280. Public investment was
about 15% of total investment, which yields a value of 2 = 0:0745; while total public
consumption was about 19% of GDP. The value taken from National Accounts yield
a value for 1 = 0:1923: These gures yield a value for 4 = 1 1 2 3 = 0:4052 for
total transfers to consumers. The values for depreciation rates are calculated from
Greek National Accounts, where gross capital consumption values are provided. Ac-
cordingly we set a value for Kp = 0:06 and Kg = 0:04, we compute steady state
values for capital asKp;SS = Ip;SS=Kp = 316:7667 andKg;SS = Ig;SS=Kg = 83:8500:
The values for e¤ective average tax rates ( c;  l;  k;  ss; ) are taken from Boscá
et al. (2012), who use the methodology developed by Mendoza et al. (1994). The
real return of the Greek bond at the calibration period was RB = 0:045: Equation
(26), provides a steady state relationship between RB and ; given a value for
 k = 0:1640: The value we obtain is  = 0:9673: Once we have this value, equation
(25) together with the value of Kp delivers R = 0:1005: From equation (13) and the
value for public capital we obtain a value for p = 0:3184:
Equate the marginal products of public and private capital to get:
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Rpt = pAtK
p 1
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

Rgt = gAtK
p
p;t 1K
g 1
g;t 1 [L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

Rpt
Rgt
=
p
g
Kg;t 1
Kp;t 1
If we assume that the real return to public capital is equal to the real return to
private capital, we can compute a value for g = p(Kg=Kp) = 0:0843: With the
data from the OECD data series on public sector labor and wages for Greece, we
obtain the ratio of public labor to private labor in 2002-2006, Lg;SS=Lp;SS = 0:2399;
while the wage premium for the same year was, Wg;SS=Wp;SS = 1:400:
Comparing Greeces labour market with Europe (gures 2 and 3), we observe
the same trend of a decrease in the participation of public labor in total employ-
ment, with an increase in the wage premium. The dissimilarity that might have
scal consequences relates to the level of the wage premium. While in Europe in
2008 the average wage premium was about 1.3, the same magnitude for Greece was
1.4. That is 7:69% higher in Greece. The weight of public employment relative to
private employment and the elasticity of substitution between public and private
labor inputs are estimated econometrically. From the production function, we can
obtain the ratio of public wages to private wages as5:
Wg;t
Wp;t
=
1  

L 1g;t
L 1p;t
(27)
From this expression we get, taking logs
log

Wg;t
Wp;t

= log

1  


+ (   1) log

Lg;t
Lp;t

(28)
and estimate by OLS6. From the estimation7 for Greece we obtain the values for
 = 0:6008 and  = 0:4326: Results from the estimation are represented in the lower
panel of Figures 2 and 3. When we estimate the coe¢ cients of equation (28) we nd
values of  and  that imply that a wage premium is being paid by the government
to public workers.
5See appendix A.2 for a derivation of equation (27)
6The estimation procedure is explained in Fernández-de-Córdoba, Pérez and Torres (2012). An
alternative to the estimation is to x Wp = 1; and set Wg = wage premiumWp; and then obtain
the value for ; and x  to a reasonable value.
7The OLS estimation for Greece produces a R2 = 0:7468; the F statistic is F = 138:5908; and a
p value for the model p = 0:0000, while the same values for Europe are R 2 = 0:9199; F = 424:6571;
and p = 0:
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We set a total labor endowment of H = 100; and from the OECD labor statistics
we have L = 57:500 for the year 2002. This number, plus the public to private labor
ratio yield the corresponding values for Lp; and Lg: The production function gets
fully calibrated computing A as a residual:
A =
Y
K
p
p K
g
g [L

p + (1  )Lg ]
(1 p g)

= 1:4733
Fix  =  1; in the government public sector objective function, and compute the
value for ! as
! =
1
1 +

Wg
Lg
 = 0:0765
Finally, we compute  as:
 =
Cp + Cg
Cp + Cg + (H   Lp   Lg)Wp 1  l1+k
= 0:8437
We collect the parameter values in two tables. The rst table (Table 1) contains
values taken from National Accounts, average e¤ective tax rates and depreciation
rates. Table 2 shows the set of parameters that we calibrate using the equilibrium
conditions from the model.
[Insert here Figure 2]
[Insert here Figure 3]
Table 1: The Greek economy calibrated parameters
Parameter Denition Value
Y Total GDP 100
G=Y Ratio total public spending/output 0.4504
I=Y Ratio total investment/output 0.2336
C=Y Ratio total consumption/output 0.7764
1 Ratio public consumption/total government spending 0.1923
2 Ratio public investment/total government spending 0.0745
 l Labor income tax rate 0.4100
 k Capital income tax rate 0.1640
 ss Social security contribution 0.4406
 Prot tax rate 0.2500
 c Consumption tax rate 0.1480
 Private/public consumption rate of substitution 1
Kp Private capital depreciation rate 0.06
Kg Public capital depreciation rate 0.04
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Table 2: The Greek economy model-calibrated parameters
Parameter Denition Value
RB Real return of a Greek bond 0.0405
 Discount factor 0.9673
R Real return to capital 0.1005
p Private capital income share 0.3184
g Public capital technical parameter 0.0843
 Public-Private employment elasticity of substitution 0.4326
 Private employment weight 0.6008
 Public wages/employment elasticity of substitution -1.0000
! Public wages weight 0.0765
3 Ratio wage bill/total government spending 0.3280
4 Ratio transfers/total government spending 0.4052
A FTP 1.4733
 Consumption preferences 0.8437
4 The debt frontier
Given the calibrated parameters and the key macroeconomic ratios for the period
2002-2006 for the Greek economy, we compute the steady state of the model econ-
omy. A key result from the model is the existence of a negative relationship between
public debt long-run sustainable limit and government size measured as the total
government spending to GDP ratio, given a particular menu of taxes, i.e., a par-
ticular level of scal revenues and given an interest rate on public debt. A larger
government size, given a constant level of public revenues, corresponds to a lower
long-run sustainable level of public debt. The intuition behind this result is simple.
In our model, public debt is modelled as if bond markets were innitely liquid and
thus, any maturing bond can always be rolled over at the given rate in the steady
state. In this context, the long term sustainable amount of debt depends on both
public revenues and expenditures and on the public bond interest rate. The sustain-
able debt limit is increasing in public revenues and decreasing in public expenditure
and bond interest rate. A negative shock to output will reduce both the public
income/output ratio and the public expenditure/output ratio, driving the economy
toward the long-run unsustainable debt area on one hand, and reducing the long-run
sustainable amount of debt on the other hand.
Our main result is better explained with Figure 4. The decreasing relationship
between Public Expenditure to GDP ratio Gt=Yt; and total debt to GDP ratio,
Bt=Yt in our notation, separates the space into two disjoint sub-spaces. Above the
curve we have all pairs where given the ratio Gt=Yt; the amount of endogenous scal
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revenues are not enough to cover the services of total debt. Below the curve, we
have all data pairs where scal revenues su¢ ce to cover the given Gt=Yt ratio and
services the outstanding debt.
[Insert here Figure 4]
Two points are highlighted in the graph (blue circles). Both correspond to the
observed ratio GSS=YSS = 0:4504 for Greece. The upper point is on the Debt to
GDP curve, showing that the maximum level of sustainable debt as a percentage of
GDP that Greece can a¤ord given the structure of public expenditures is 236:5467%.
The lower point shows the actual level of Debt to GDP ratio at the steady state. As
the reader can check, it belongs to the sustainable set. From this point, any reduc-
tion of total expenditure improves the credit position of Greece in the international
debt markets. The vertical line drawn at Gt=Yt = 0:5423; shows the ratio of total
expenditure to GDP that would force Greece to cancel all its outstanding debt. It
is clear from the graph that this point is su¢ ciently far away from the actual steady
state ratio previous to the crisis.
Figure 4 also plots the actual values of both ratios for the period 2002-2011.
These ratios, for the period 2002-2006 remain almost constant at a value of total
public spending/GDP of 45% and a public debt/GDP of around 100%. We also
highlight the "Gambling for Redemption" period, for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Whereas the gures for 2007 are still well inside the long-run sustainable area, the
gures for 2008 are clearly in the unsustainable area. Moreover, the corresponding
gures for 2009 reects an even worse situation, as the public expenditure to GDP
ratio reaches a level for which no positive amount of public debt is sustainable. By
that time, nancial markets were clearly betting for a default.
From this picture, we conclude that the current nancial crisis a¤ecting Greece
has to be explained by an approach not directly linked to the fundamentals of the
economy, as a carefully calibrated standard neoclassical growth model shows. Prior
to the crisis, the Greek economy was well inside the long-run sustainable debt area
with a public budget carrying with it a constant level of public debt/GDP ratio.
Nevertheless, the crisis rapidly deteriorated GDP and public revenues, driving the
Greek economy to the long-run unsustainable area. One can argue that the initial
value of public debt was too high (around 100% of GDP) and that a lower level
of public debt would have increased the strength of the Greek economy to cope
with the crisis and remain in the long-run sustainable area. However, looking to
the evolution of the Greek economy from 2007, an initial lower level of public debt
does not guarantee that it would have avoided the debt crisis, given the evolution
of Public Expenditures to GDP.
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From Figure 4 it is clear that small reductions in the Public Expenditure to GDP
ratio induce large increases in the Debt to GDP ratio. The immediate implication is
that reductions of expenditure above the expected decrease in GDP, together with
an increase in scal revenues from increased taxation should be enough to guarantee
the solvency of the Greek State. Conversely, increases in the public expenditures to
GDP ratio deteriorates the credit position very rapidly. The data shows that the
swing to the right in the expenditures to GDP ratio from 2006 to 2009 was too large.
5 Conclusions
This paper develops a DGE model in which the government is fully characterized in
both income and spending sides. The model shows the existence of a negative rela-
tionship between public debt long-run sustainable limit and government size, given
a particular menu of taxes. As the government size becomes larger, given a constant
level of public revenues, the long-run sustainable level of public debt becomes lower.
Therefore, the model can be used to quantify for a particular economy, the distance
between the current level of public debt and the long-run sustainable level.
Calibration of the model for the Greek economy reveals that, for the period just
before the current recession, the steady state public debt/GDP ratio (the long-run
sustainability level) was 236.5%, whereas the gure in 2002-2006, the steady state
reference, was around 100%. We nd evidence that a Gambling for Redemption
attitude towards the crisis, as in Conesa and Kehoe (2011) and Arellano, Conesa
and Kehoe (2012) can explain quite well the path of the Greek economy from 2007.
As Conesa and Kehoe (2011) point out, countries that are in deep recessions have
the incentive to cut government spending very slowly and increase the public debt,
gambling that a recovery in the economy will lead to larger scal revenues. This
argument is consistent with the recent experience of Greece during the period 2007-
2009. Nevertheless, the debt-sustainability problem emerges when the recession is
prolonged. In this case, government revenues never recover and the gamble for
redemption cannot be maintained indenitely, forcing the default.
The consequence we extract from this paper is that the government gambled for
redemption and lost the bet. Period by period for three consecutive years, the global
economy deteriorated, scal revenues never recovered, and suddenly astronomical
bond yields indicated that the game was over.
The historically observed frequency of the cycle can entice governments to gamble
for redemption with the hope that the next expected expansion will dissolve past
scal decits. This implies that the Gambling for Redemption attitude towards
a crisis can be the product of our past statistical knowledge of the cycle. It is
reasonable, as we argue, and also optimal as Conesa and Kehoe demonstrate, to
gamble for redemption when purely statistically based policies are put in place.
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Once the economic policy that emerges from a Gambling for Redemption strategy
is proved incorrect by reality, some structural adjustments have to be put in place.
The table in Appendix B shows that policies oriented to increase productivity, to-
gether with a scal package that includes increases in VAT, labor taxes and corporate
taxes, plus a re-structuring of public expenditures increasing public investment, at
the expense of transfers, can be e¤ective to solve a debt crisis. The proposed combi-
nation of increasing by 10% the following vector of policy instruments ( k;  l; ; 3)
would depress output by  3:04%; it would depress private consumption and pub-
lic consumption by  2:73% and  3:03% respectively, and it would depress private
investment by  4:03%; but it would rise the debt ceiling by 48:37%:
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Appendix A.1: WalrasLaw
Take the budget constraint faced by the consumer:
(1 +  ct)Cp;t +Kp;t  Kp;t 1 +Bt+1  Bt
= (1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] + (1   kt )(Rt   )Kp;t 1
+(1   kt )RBt Bt + Zt +t
And substitute the value of
Zt = Gt   Cg;t   (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t   Ig;t
to obtain:
(1 +  ct)Cp;t + Igt +Kp;t  Kp;t 1 +Bt+1  Bt
= (1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] + (1   kt )(Rt   )Kp;t 1
+Gt + (1   kt )RBt Bt   Cg;t   (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t +t
Cpt + Cg;t + Igt + Ipt +Bt+1  Bt
=   ctCp;t + (1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] +RtKp;t 1    kt
 
Rt   Kp

Kp;t 1
+Gt + (1   kt )RBt Bt   (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t +t
But, the government identity establishes the following relation:
(1 +RBt )Bt  Bt+1 = Tt  Gt
Direct substitution yields
Cpt + Cg;t + Igt + Ipt   Tt
=   ctCp;t + (1   lt)[Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t] +RtKp;t 1    kt
 
Rt   Kp

Kp;t 1
  ktRBt Bt   (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t +t
Government scal income is given by:
Tt = 
c
tCp;t + 
l
t(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 
k
t (Rt   Kp)Kp;t 1
+ ktR
B
t Bt + 
ss
t (Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t)
Substitution and elimination drives to:
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Cpt + Cg;t + Igt + Ipt
= Wp;tLp;t +RtKp;t 1 +t +  sst Wp;tLp;t
From the denition of prots we nd that,
t = Yt   (1 +  sst )Wp;tLp;t  RtKp;t
Substitution yields:
Cpt + Cg;t + Igt + Ipt = Yt
Therefore, WalrasLaw is satised at all times.
Appendix A.2: Positive prots
In a private economy where the government supply capital and labor with market
pricing, the rm would have a prot function as:
t = Yt   (1 +  sst )(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) Rt(Kp;t 1 +Kg;t 1)
Where
Yt = AtK
p
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

Under the assumptions that private factors are paid their marginal productivity, we
get:
(1+ sst )Wp;t = (1 p g)AtKpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t+(1 )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 L 1p;t (29)
(1+  sst )Wg;t = (1 )(1 p g)AtKpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t+(1 )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 L 1g;t
(30)
Rt = pAtK
p 1
p;t 1K
g
g;t 1[L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

Rg;t = gAtK
p
p;t 1K
g 1
g;t 1 [L

p;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)

From the above equations we can obtain all income shares as:
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(1 +  sst )Wp;tLp;t = (1  p   g)AtKpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 Lp;t(31)
=
(1  p   g)Lp;t
Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t
Yt (32)
(1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t = (1  )(1  p   g)AtKpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 Lg;t
=
(1  )(1  p   g)Lg;t
Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t
Yt
RtKp;t 1 = pYt
and
Rg;tKg;t 1 = gYt
Prots are zero because of the homogeneity of the production function:
t = Yt  
(1  p   g)Lp;t
Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t
Yt  
(1  )(1  p   g)Lp;t
Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t
Y   pYt   gYt;
t = Yt (1  (1  p   g)  p   g) = 0
If, on the contrary, the government pays public factor through taxes, then there are
positive prots.
Division of equation (29) by (30) yields equation (27) of section 3.
Appendix A.3: Equilibrium conditions and deni-
tion
The collection of the models rst order conditions, market clearing and resource
constraints are:
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1
Cp;t + Cg;t
  t(1 +  ct) = 0 (33)
 (1  ) 1
NtH   Lp;t   Lg;t
+ t(1   lt)Wp;t = 0 (34)


t+1
 
1 + (1   kt+1)(Rt+1   Kp)
  t = 0 (35)
t 1   t(1 + (1   kt )RBt ) = 0 (36)
Lt   Lp;t   Lg;t = 0 (37)
Yt   AtKpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)
 = 0 (38)
Rt   pAtKp 1p;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g)
 = 0 (39)
(1 +  sst )Wp;t 
(1  p   g)AtKpp;t 1Kgg;t 1[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]
(1 p g )
 L 1p;t = 0
(40)
t  

g +
(1  )(1  p   g)Lg;t
[Lp;t + (1  )Lg;t]

Yt = 0 (41)
Kp;t   ((1  Kp)Kp;t 1 + Ip;t) = 0 (42)
Kg;t  
 
(1  Kg)Kg;t 1 + Ig;t

= 0 (43)
Gt   (Cg;t + (1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t + Ig;t + Zt) = 0 (44)
Cg;t   1Gt = 0 (45)
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Ig;t   2Gt = 0 (46)
(1 +  sst )Wg;tLg;t   3Gt = 0 (47)
Zt   4Gt = 0 (48)
Wg;t  

!
1  !
 1=2 
3Gt
(1 +  sst )
1=2
= 0 (49)
Lg;t  

!
1  !
1=2 
3Gt
(1 +  sst )
1=2
= 0 (50)
Tt  

 ctCp;t + 
l
t(Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 
k
t (Rt   Kp)Kp;t 1
+ sst (Wp;tLp;t +Wg;tLg;t) + 
k
tR
B
t Bt + 

tt

= 0 (51)
Gt + (1 +R
B
t )Bt   (Tt +Bt+1) = 0 (52)
This set of conditions fully characterizes a unique solution for any given policy
vector. The complete set of equations of the model is completed with the budget
constraint of the consumer and the following transversality conditions:
lim
t!1
ttKt+1 = 0
lim
t!1
1
(1 +R)t
Bt = 0
Denition of equilibrium: An equilibrium for this economy is a vector of prices
(Wg;Wp; R), a vector of input quantities (Lg; Lp; Kg; Kp); and a vector of private
consumption and investment (Cp; Ip) such that for a given scal policy summarized
by a collection of taxes ( c;  l;  k;  ss; ) and expenditure proportions (1; 2; 3; 4);
induce a vector of public consumption, investment, transfers, and debt services
(Cg; Ip; Z;RB), such that the optimization problems of the household, the rm, and
the government are satised in a way that the resources constraints are satised and
all markets clear.
Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis
The results shown in the paper relate interest rates to the ratios Gt=Yt and Bt=Yt:
We have seen during the crisis enormous variations in the yields that the Greek
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bond had to pay to be attractive in the markets. In the calibration period 2002-
2006, we observe a steady relation in the ratio G=Y ' 0:45; and B=Y ' 100%:
The implication is that when the yield of the bond increases by a factor of four, the
expenditure made by the government in any other area has to decrease by a similar
amount, and we know how extremely di¢ cult this is. The result is that an enormous
jump in the debt frontier has to take place.
In this appendix we analyze the sensitivity of the model to changes in some key
parameters. Table B.1 shows the percentage change in the relevant variables given
an increase of 10% in the parameters of the rst row. Several interesting results
emerge from this sensitivity analysis. Overall, this exercise shows the robustness
of the model. As expected, a rise in Total Factor Productivity increases output,
consumption and investment in the same amount. Additionally, the sustainability
debt level increases by 16.5%, showing that public debt sustainability is also very
sensible to productivity shocks.
An increase in taxes has a negative impact on all macroeconomic variables but on
the sustainability debt level. From our model specication, a higher level of public
revenues, given a particular government size, allows to cover a higher amount of
debt services. The higher impact came from the labor income tax and consumption
tax. Also note that the public debt interest rate is a¤ected by the change in the
capital income tax rate, increasing the cost of borrowing and partially compensating
the positive e¤ect on the creditworthiness of the Greek debt.
Also of interest is the reaction of our model economy to changes in total gov-
ernment spending composition. A rise in the proportion of public consumption (1)
does not a¤ect output and investment, reducing private consumption and raising
public consumption by the same amount. Nevertheless, this policy change reduces
the long-run sustainability debt limit by around 2%. A rise in public investment
(2) has a positive impact on all macroeconomic variables, raising the long-run sus-
tainability debt limit by 0.75%. The positive impact of a rise in public wage bill
(3) on output, consumption and investment is easily explained, as more public em-
ployment is added to the aggregate production function, in spite of a fall in private
employment. At the same time, the residual parameter 4 is reduced by the same
amount. Therefore public accounts remain unchanged while more factors are placed
into the production function. The table also shows that a change in the composition
of wages and public employment has mild e¤ects on the economy. A reduction in
civil servantscompensations increases the debt ceiling by just 1% at the cost of
 0:67% decrease in output.
Table B.1: Sensitivity Analysis
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10% Y Cp Cg Ip Ig B Lp Lg RB
A 19.94 19.94 19.94 19.94 19.94 16.49 -1.79 9.51 0.00
 k -0.79 -0.47 -0.79 -1.80 -0.79 5.11 -0.06 -0.39 2.56
 l -2.87 -2.87 -2.87 -2.87 -2.87 21.33 -3.38 -1.44 0.00
 c -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 15.44 -0.60 -0.25 0.00
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.77 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kp -3.38 -4.53 -3.38 0.28 -3.38 -7.08 0.85 -1.70 0.00
Kg -1.66 -1.66 -1.66 -1.66 -1.66 -1.41 0.15 -0.83 0.00
! -0.67 -0.67 -0.67 -0.67 -0.67 0.99 1.02 -5.34 0.00
1 0.00 -1.29 10.00 0.00 0.00 -2.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.89 1.33 1.89 1.89 12.08 0.75 0.06 0.94 0.00
3 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 12.41 -0.98 5.21 0.00
We complete our sensitivity analysis with a variation of the yield. Figure 5 shows
how the frontier moves inwards as a consequence of an increase of 25% in the yield of
the Greek bond. Notice that the e¤ective spreads of the Greek bond with respect to
the German Bund were much larger. Since the very beginning of the negotiations of
the details of the rescue package for Greece by April 2010, the spreads skyrocketed
due to a number of reasons. One of those reasons is discussed in Chamley and
Pinto (2011). They argue that the seniority of the new bonds issued to nance
the rescue program would disincentivize other private investors from buying Greek
bonds. However, we agree with Arellano, Conesa and Kehoe (2012) in saying that
the rescue package was an e¤ective mechanism to provide liquidity to the Greek
State at a controlled yield.
[Insert here Figure 5]
Figure 5 shows that the scal ratios displayed by the Greek economy prior to
the crisis were sustainable at the yield of 5%, that is, the real return of the rescue
package bond was consistent with a long-term sustainability of the Greek State prior
to the unfolding of events that drove Greece to the current crisis.
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Figure 1: Total public spending and public debt as percentage of GDP.
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Figure 2: Public/Private Labor in Greece
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Figure 3: Public/Private Labor in the Europe
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Figure 4: The Greek Debt Frontier
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